Several weeks ago, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued a decision in Redline Detection, LLC v. Star Envirotech, Inc., relating to an inter partes review (IPR) challenge brought by Redline challenging the validity of certain patent claims of U.S. Patent No. 6,526,808 (the “’808 patent”).
After deciding to institute the IPR, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) found in favor of the patent owner. Redline appealed the decision of the PTAB to the Federal Circuit, arguing that it was improperly denied the opportunity to submit supplemental information under 37 C.F.R. §42.123(a) and that the PTAB erred with respect to finding that claims 9 and 10 of the ‘808 patent were not invalid.
The ‘808 patent, owned by Star Envirotech, relates to methods of generating smoke for use in volatile and explosive environments. More specifically, the ’808 patent describes methods for generating smoke that enables the presence and location of leaks in a fluid system to be accurately and visually detected depending upon rate of the air flow through the fluid system under test and whether smoke escapes from the system. The invention allows for the more accurate testing of whether automobile emissions are leaking into the environment.
Several weeks ago, in a per curiam decision with only Judge Newman dissenting, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit denied the Sequenom petition for rehearing en banc. See Ariosa Diagnostics, Inv. v. Sequenom, Inc. Sequenom, the patent holder, had already hired Thomas Goldstein, the founder of SCOTUS blog and renowned Supreme Court advocate, as a part of their appellate team. The case will now undoubtedly move to the Supreme Court. We can only hope that the Supreme Court will take the case and once and for all decide whether they intended for all genomic innovations, no matter how revolutionary, to be patent-ineligible.
If you look quickly at the per curiam decision, you might mistakenly believe that there is a unanimity of thought at the Federal Circuit on the issue of patent eligibility. After all, the case was denied en banc rehearing. But there were three separate written opinions, two concurring with the denial and only Judge Newman dissenting. In truth, if you take the time to read the opinions, you realize that all four of the Judges who signed opinions believe the Supreme Court is wrong on patent eligibility. Given Judge Linn’s concurring opinion at the panel level, we can safely conclude that he too believes the Supreme Court is wrong on this matter.
After the brief per curiam decision, several written opinions followed. First, Judge Lourie, who was joined by Judge Moore, wrote that while the claims at issue may be susceptible to challenge for being too broad or indefinite, “they should not be patent-ineligible on the ground that they set forth natural laws or are abstractions.”
Lourie would go on to conclude:
In sum, it is unsound to have a rule that takes inventions of this nature out of the realm of patent-eligibility on grounds that they only claim a natural phenomenon plus conventional steps, or that they claim abstract concepts. But I agree that the panel did not err in its conclusion that under Supreme Court precedent it had no option other than to affirm the district court.
Even Judge Dyk, who is more skeptical of patents than most of the other judges on the Federal Circuit, thinks the Supreme Court went too far in Mayo, but wrote separately that he believes that any additional guidance must come from the Supreme Court, not the Federal Circuit.
In an uncharacteristically short dissent, Judge Newman wrote:
Precedent does not require that all discoveries of natural phenomena or their application in new ways or for new uses are ineligible for patenting… The new diagnostic method here is novel and unforeseen, and is of profound public benefit… The panel’s decision to withhold access to patenting, now endorsed by the en banc court’s refusal to rehear the case, is devoid of support.
Judge Newman also went on to remind us all that patenting “facilitate[s] the public benefit of provision of this method through medical diagnostic commerce, rather than remaining a laboratory curiosity.”
We haven’t heard the last of this case. The question remains, however, whether the Supreme Court will take the case when given the opportunity or whether they will allow this ruling and the confusion to remain indefinitely.
On November 13, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit decided to take a case en banc that will require the court to resolve issues relating to the on-sale bar of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
The case is The Medicines Company v. Hospira, Inc., which was decided by Judges Dyk, Wallach, and Hughes on July 2, 2015. The original panel decision, which was authored by Judge Hughes, has been vacated and the appeal reinstated.
The Medicines Company filed a combined petition for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc. The petition was considered by the panel that heard the appeal and thereafter referred to those judges on the full court who are in regular active service (i.e., judges on senior status who did not participate in the panel hearing do not participate in en banc petitions). A response was invited by the court and filed by defendant/cross-appellant Hospira, Inc.
The Federal Circuit recently issued a non-precedential opinion in Vehicle IP, LLC v. AT&T Mobility, LLC. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of this decision was that it was a non-precedential opinion with a dissent, which to some extent seems a bit contradictory.
The tale begins back on December 31, 2009, when Vehicle IP filed a patent infringement action against the Appellees in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware. The patent infringement lawsuit asserted that Appellees infringed U.S. Patent No. 5,987,377 (“the ’377 patent”). On December 12, 2011, the district court issued an order construing the disputed claim terms of the ’377 patent, including “expected time of arrival” and “way point(s).” The district court construed “expected time of arrival” as “time of day at which the vehicle is expected to arrive somewhere (and not remaining travel time).” The district court construed “way point(s)” as “intermediate point(s) on the way to the final destination (and not the final destination itself).”
After the district court construed the claims, Appellees filed two motions for summary judgment. The district court granted both motions. On April 19, 2013, the district court entered judgment in favor of Appellees. Vehicle IP appealed the entry of judgment, challenging the district court’s claim constructions and summary judgment rulings.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit recently issued a unanimous panel decision in Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics, Inc. This decision may have more far-reaching implications for patent reform than any other decision reached by any court in recent memory. The issue of particular interest in this case was willful infringement, and in a concurring opinion, Judges O’Malley and Hughes wrote that the majority was constrained by the Federal Circuit’s precedent in In re Seagate and Bard Peripheral Vascular v. W.L. Gore, but that recent Supreme Court decisions call into question the continued viability of that precedent. As such, Judges O’Malley and Hughes urged the Federal Circuit to reconsider en banc the standard for awarding enhanced damages under 35 U.S.C. 284.
The case came to the Federal Circuit on an appeal by Halo Electronics, Inc. (“Halo”), who appealed from multiple decisions of the United States District Court for the District of Nevada. First, Halo appealed the granting of summary judgment that Pulse Electronics, Inc. and Pulse Electronics Corp. (collectively “Pulse”) did not sell or offer to sell within the United States the accused products they manufactured for delivery to buyers outside the United States. Second, Halo also appealed the granting of summary judgment that Pulse did not directly infringe Halo’s U.S. Patents 5,656,985 (the “’985 patent”), 6,297,720(the “’720 patent”), and 6,344,785 (the “’785 patent”) (collectively “the Halo patents”). Finally, Halo appealed the holding that Pulse’s infringement of the Halo patents with respect to certain accused products that Pulse sold and delivered in the United States was not willful.