Patent Law Practice Center

Supreme Court Grants Certiorari In Prometheus V. Mayo (Again)

On Monday, the United States Supreme Court agreed to consider whether to set limits on when inventors can patent medical diagnostic tests.  Our friends at Foley & Lardner sent in this article discussing the history of the case, the issues being considered by the Court and the potential impact this case may have on intellectual property in the personalized medicine space.

On June 20, 2011, the United States Supreme Court granted Mayo’s petition for certiorari in Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Services, 628 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010), a case addressing patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 of certain method claims relevant to personalized medicine. While the issue under consideration here does not relate to whether isolated genes and other alleged “products of nature” are patent-eligible, the Court in Prometheus will likely address whether and how one can claim methods that take advantage of correlations between an individual’s personal health/genetic make-up and possible health care options.

As discussed in postings on Foley’s Personalized Medicine Bulletin and PharmaPatents blogs, Mayo Collaborative Services filed a second petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court after the Federal Circuit upheld the claims (for a second time) on remand after the Supreme Court’s decision in Bilski v. Kappos (2010). Representative claims in Prometheus include: (more…)

Upcoming Audio Briefings On Recent Supreme Court Decisions

The Supreme Court  has decided three cases this past month that could have a big effect on patent law.  To help you understand the significance of these decisions and their implications, PLI is offering three timely and topical One-Hour Audio Briefings.

1. June 24th – Global-Tech v. SEB: Supreme Court Holds knowledge Requirement Satisfied by Willful Blindness for Patent Infringement:  On May 31, 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down its decision in Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A. In an 8–1 decision, with Justice Alito writing for the Court, the Court concluded that induced infringement requires knowledge that the induced acts constitute patent infringement, not just knowledge that it was encouraging certain acts which just happened to infringe a patent. Examining the statutory language and tracing pre–adoption case law, the Court further concluded that a defendant’s deliberate indifference to a known risk that a patent exists would not be sufficient to demonstrate knowledge, which was the Federal Circuit’s view below, but that “willful blindness,” well–established in the criminal law context, is enough to satisfy the knowledge element. Although it announced a different standard, the Court concluded that the evidence in this case easily satisfied that standard. For such a doctrine to apply, a defendant must subjectively believe that there is a high probability that a fact exists, and must take deliberate actions to avoid learning of that fact. In dissent, Justice Kennedy argued that the Court took a step too far in concluding that willful blindness is a form of knowledge, and would have required actual knowledge.  This briefing will be conducted by Peter J. Brann, a partner in the law firm of Brann & Isaacson, whose practice focuses on intellectual property litigation, R. Ted Cruz of Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP and counsel of record for SEB, and William Dunnegan of Dunnegan LLC and counsel of record for Global-Tech Appliances. (more…)

Stanford v. Roche and Ownership of Federally Funded Research: Navigating the Vagaries of Contract Law

Mary Hess Eliason, an Associate with Birch Stewart Kolasch and Birch, sent in this article discussing the recent Supreme Court decision of Stanford v. Roche .  The article highlights key points in both Chief Justice Roberts’ majority opinion and Justice Breyer’s dissent and questions whether this case presented the appropriate fact situation to address the issues at hand.

When an invention is conceived, it is generally presumed to be owned by the inventor under U.S. patent law.[1] The Supreme Court Opinion of Stanford v. Roche reinforces this maxim in the context of federally funded research.  The issue brought before the Supreme Court was, in the context of federally funded research, whether the ownership of the invention automatically arises with the federal contractor (i.e., Stanford) or with the inventor under the Bayh-Dole Act 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 and whether the inventor can interfere with any right of the federal contractor by assigning the invention to a third party.[2]

In their recent majority opinion, the Supreme Court decided that, based on contract law, an Inventor could assign an invention to a third party, even if the invention was federally funded under Bayh-Dole. (more…)

Gene Quinn on the Supreme Court’s Stanford v. Roche Decision

Big news for the technology transfer world…. earlier today, the Supreme Court issued it’s decision in Stanford v. Roche. The issue in the case was, in the context of federally funded research, the ownership of the invention first arises with the federal contractor (i.e., Stanford) or with the inventor under the Bayh-Dole Act 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 and whether the inventor can interfere with that right by assigning the invention to a third party.  Gene Quinn, of IPWatchdog and Practice Center Contributor, passed along this article summarizing the opinion and what lasting consequences, if any, it will have on the patent community.

This morning the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Stanford v. Roche, a decision that has been much anticipated in the technology transfer world.  Technology transfer is the front line for the interfacing of University research and private sector commercialization, so it is no great wonder that this case captured the attention of academia and the private sector alike. At issue in the case was whether the Bayh-Dole Act automatically vested ownership of patent rights in Universities when the underlying research was federally funded.

It is not at all an exaggeration to say that Bayh-Dole is one of the most successful pieces of domestic legislation ever enacted into law. The Bayh-Dole Act, which was enacted on December 12, 1980, was revolutionary in its outside-the-box thinking, creating an entirely new way to conceptualize the innovation to marketplace cycle. It has lead to the creation of 7,000 new businesses based on the research conducted at U.S. Universities. Prior to the enactment of Bayh-Dole there was virtually no federally funded University technology licensed to the private sector, no new businesses and virtually no revolutionary University innovations making it to the public. Bayh-Dole set out to remedy this situation, and as a direct result of the passage of Bayh-Dole countless technologies have been commercialized, including many life saving cures and treatments for a variety of diseases and afflictions. In fact, the Economist in 2002 called Bayh-Dole the most inspired and successful legislation over the previous half-century. Nevertheless, the question remained, at least until this morning, whether ownership of patent rights immediately vested in the University as the result of federal funding.

Click here to read Gene Quinn’s full publication.

 

The Gold Seal of Ownership: Stanford v. Roche and Ownership of Federally Funded Research

Mary Hess Eliason, an Associate of Birch, Stewart, Kolasch an Birch, sent in this article she wrote discussing the Stanford v. Roche case.  Eliason highlights the issues being brought before the Supreme Court and the possible effects of this case if Stanford prevails.

When an invention is conceived, it is generally presumed to be owned by the inventor under U.S. patent law. [1] The case of Stanford v. Roche demonstrates that this may not be true in the context of federally funded research.  The issue being brought before the Supreme Court is whether, in the context of federally funded research, the ownership of the invention first arises with the federal contractor (i.e., Stanford) or with the inventor under the Bayh-Dole Act 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 and whether the inventor can interfere with that right by assigning the invention to a third party.[2]                                                    

The facts of Stanford v. Roche show a commonly occurring relationship between inventors, research institutions and collaborators, especially in the biotechnological field. [3]In 1988, inventor Holodniy joined a laboratory at Stanford University as a research fellow.  Upon joining the laboratory, Holodniy signed an agreement stating “I agree to assignor confirm in writing to Stanford . . . right, title and interest in . . . such inventions as required by Contracts or Grants”.  (more…)